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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
escrow agreement. Respondent defended on the ground that the
relief could be sought only in a plenary action and that a special
proceeding would not lie. The supreme court, special term, held
that the respondent had waived his right to object as to form by
not raising an objection to the form of the procedure at trial; 2 that
the objection could not be raised initially on a motion for leave to
re-argue. Because of the procedural distinctions that existed between
actions and special proceedings, applications brought in the wrong
form under prior law were dismissed on that ground alone. Appli-
cation of this rule became "absurd when made in a case in which
the court could dispose of the issues equally well, and without
prejudice to the rights of the respondent . ... "3 In the enactment
of CPLR 103(c), the CPLR recognizes that fact and changes that
prior law rule. Under CPLR 103(c), if a court obtains "jurisdiction
over the parties, a civil judicial proceeding shall not be dismissed
solely because it is not brought in the proper form. . . ." The
court is directed instead to make whatever order is required for its
prosecution. The instant decision further indicates that whatever
defense is left to defendants (or respondents) under this liberal
CPLR provision may be lost by an untimely objection to form.
The court, in its opinion, indicated that because there was no
attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent a
plenary action and not a special proceeding would have been appro-
priate. But since the respondent did not raise the objection to
form in the original special proceeding, he was held to have waived
it. The court noted that under CPLR 103 the distinction between
an action and a proceeding is not a jurisdictional one.
The implications of CPLR 103 carry even further. The
practitioner should note that even if the respondent had raised the
objection timely (i.e., in the proceeding itself and prior to disposition
of it), the result would not have been a dismissal. It would have
been, at most, a conversion of the special proceeding into an action
with pleadings and time periods adjusted accordingly.4
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TIME
Court of Appeals confirms that recoupment counterclaim against
assignee is valid although arising after assignment and
notice thereof.
In an action by an assignee of a claim arising out of a contract
between defendant and plaintiff's assignor, defendant, after he had
2Avalon E., Inc. v. Monaghan, 43 Misc. 2d 401, 251 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
33 N.Y. JUD. CouNciL REP. 129, 145 (1937).
4 See the initial installment of the Biannual Survey of New York Practice,
38 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 190, 197-98 (1963).
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received notice of its assignment to the plaintiff, counterclaimed
for commissions that arose out of the contract. The court held that
the claim could be pleaded although it arose after notice of the
assigrunent. 5
Prior to 1936, CPA § 266 clearly defined two types of counter-
claims: the set-off, which arose as a result of a transaction other
than the one sued upon; and the recoupment, which was related to
the transaction on which plaintiff was suing. The latter, it was
clear, could be pleaded although it arose after the assignment while
the former could only be interposed if it arose before notice of the
assignment.0
In 1936, CPA §§ 266 and 267 were amended. The amend-
ments left doubt as to whether the distinction was continued.7
Some judges decided cases from the point of view that the distinction
was abolished while others ruled with the distinction in mind.,
This conflict was brought into the CPLR by 3019(c), which is
essentially the same, for present purposes, as its CPA counterpart.
In the instant case the court of appeals ended all doubt by
ruling that the distinction was intended to remain after the 1936
alteration of the statute, upholding the theory that "the doctrines
of set-off and recoupment promote justice and diminish circuity of
litigation." 9
It is useful here to analogize these categories of counterclaims
to the new statute of limitations provision governing them. As a
result of CPLR 203 (c) any counterclaim relates back to the time
when the complaint was interposed. "In effect, commencement of
an action extends the limitation period indefinitely as to any defenses
or counterclaims which are not barred at the time the action is
commenced."' 0  But, as to the recoupment counterclaim, even if it
was barred at the time the plaintiff's cause of action was interposed,
it will still be allowed if it "arose from the transactions, occur-
rences, or series of transactions or occurrences, upon which a claim
asserted in the complaint depends .... -" In such instance "it is
not barred to the extent of the demand in the complaint . , 12
5 james Talcott, Inc. v. Winco Sales Corp., 14 N.Y.2d 227, 199 N.E.2d
499, 250 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1964).
6For an expansion of this point see Siebert v. Dunn, often cited by the
court of appeals in the instant case. 216 N.Y. 237, 110 N.E. 447 (1915).
7 The two distinctive subdivisions were merged in 1936 in CPA § 266.
8 Whitehall Mercantile Corp. v. Jamaica Ellbee Furrier's Corp., 54
N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1945), indicated that the distinction had been ex-
tinguished. Contra, Termini v. John Arthur Exhibitions, 9 Misc. 2d 833,
169 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
9 Siebert v. Dunn, supra note 6, at 245, 110 N.E. at 450.
10 1 WEINSTEIN7, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE ff203.24
(1963).
I CPLR 203(c).
12 Ibid.
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That is, where the counterclaim is untimely under the foregoing
measure but is connected with the plaintiff's claim, it is allowed to
the extent of neutralizing plaintiff's claim; but no affirmative judg-
ment may be given on it for the defendant. If, measured by the
time plaintiff's cause of action was interposed, the counterclaim
would have been timely, such an affirmative judgment could be
granted on it. So it is with the "recoupment" counterclaim.
Where the counterclaim has no relationship to the plaintiff's claim,
on the other hand, it is not a "recoupment"; such a counterclaim
must be timely as measured by the time of plaintiff's interposition
of the main claim or defendant cannot use it for any purpose.
Section 203(e): An expansion of the types of amendments
that "relate back" and thereby avoid bar of statute of
limitations.
In Rice v. Spencer'3 plaintiff moved to amend his complaint
from one alleging defendant's liability by virtue of Section 388 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law, to one alleging liability based on
common-law negligence. Defendant contended that the amend-
ment was untimely, since the statute of limitations had run. The
court held that it may "allow the amendment of a complaint by
even allowing a cause of action barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions. But in such a case, the defendant must not be deprived of
his defense of the statute." 14 The court cited Harriss v. Tams' 5 in
support of that conclusion. It appears that the court's attention was
not called to CPLR 203(e). $
Prior to CPLR 203(e) the rule in New York, as to the rela-
tion back of amendments to complaints, was indeed based upon the
Harriss v. Tams case, wherein the plaintiff moved to amend his
complaint to add a ground alleging liability due to breach of implied
warranty. The amendment was permitted, but the court indicated
that "the defendant must not be deprived of his defense of the
statute." 16 In Harriss the court held that the type of amendment
that relates back to the time the complaint was interposed was one
that merely expands or amplifies the allegations and not one "on a
different obligation or liability."
CPLR 203(e) is intended to "overcome the effect of Harriss
v. Tams."' 7  It achieves this end by permitting amendments to
relate back unless the pleading did not give notice of the "transac-
1343 Misc. 2d 331, 250 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
4 1d . at 333, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
15 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932).
16 Id. at 240-41, 179 N.E. at 481.
17 SCOND PRE IMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRAcTICs
AND PROCEDURE 51 (1958) [herein cited as SECOND REP.]
[ VOL. 39
